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The Impact of 2008 Global Financial Crisis on the Performance of
Selected Indonesian Stocks: A Preliminary Study
Edwin Suparman*
Portek International Limited
This research is a preliminary study that analyzes the impact of the US financial markets on
Indonesian financial markets during the 2008 global financial crisis. It specifically investigates the
occurrence of contagion effect in the Indonesian IHSG index and selected LQ45 stocks with the US
S&P500 index by the measurement of correlation using simple correlation, EWMA, OGARCH, and
DCC GARCH. It also attempts to discuss on the decoupling of Indonesian market and provide recommendations on dealing with future similar events.
Keywords: Contagion, correlation analysis, 2008 crisis, decoupling, LQ45 stocks performance, Indonesian stocks

Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2008 was triggered by the closures and bail-outs of unprecedented number of financial institutions, such as
Bear Sterns, Citigroup, Lehman Brothers, US
Merrill Lynch, Dexia, Fortis, etc. Brunnermeier
(2009) gave complete blow-by-blow chronological events during the period and argued that
the current crisis was a “classical banking crisis” which was magnified via several “amplification mechanisms”.
What started off in the United States of
America triggered a plethora of banks and financial institutions failures across the Europe,
and eventually Asia. With the increased inability of customers to fulfill their mortgage obligations, banks suffer liquidity crisis which affects
their performance.
In Indonesia, a dip in Jakarta Stock Index
during September 2008 until April 2009 is
clearly observed. Such contagion effect in stock
market had been studied extensively. Untoro

and Widodo (2008) stated the same on Indonesian stock market relative to regional stock
movements, such as Singapore and Hongkong.
More recently, Wuryandani (2011) proved the
movement of Jakarta Stock Index is significantly affected by the regional stock movement, despite the different macroeconomic conditions of
every country. The significance of these studies
is two-folds. First, it becomes crucial to react
when there is any ‘first sign of trouble’ even if
that comes from outside the country (regional
or even international). Second, any kind of crisis can be affected by the contagious effect of
other stock markets. Hence, the need to consider the external movement trends for any kind of
macroeconomic policies.
With the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
in Indonesia jumped 54% to USD 13.95 billion for the first ten months of 2008, it may not
come as a surprise as investors were concerned
about the capital outflows from Indonesia during the 2008 crisis. And this is proven true as a
clear dip in FDI from the third quarter of 2008
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Table 1. Selected LQ45 2008 and 2010 stocks shareholders composition
No

Company name

Stock
code

2008 Shareholders composition
Indonesian

2010 Shareholders composition
Indonesian

Government

Foreign
(at least)

Government

Foreign
(at least)

1 PT. Bank Mandiri Tbk (MANDIRI)

BMRI

66.97%

21.87%

66.68%

26.68%

2 PT. Bank Negara Indonesia Tbk (BNI)

BBNI

76.36%

14.93%

60.00%

22.99%

3 PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia Tbk (BRI)

BBRI

56.83%

36.98%

56.75%

36.81%

4 PT. Bank Central Asia Tbk (BCA)

BBCA

-

47.15%

-

47.15%

5 PT. Jasa Marga Tbk (JASAMARGA)

JSMR

70.00%

N/A*

70.00%

N/A*

6 PT. Bakrieland Development Tbk (BAKRIELAND)

ELTY

-

30.77%

-

12.17%

7 PT. Lippo Karawaci Tbk (LIPPO)

LPKR

-

19.66%

-

18.71%

8 PT. Perusahaan Gas Negara Tbk (PGN)

PGAS

54.58%

33.28%

56.97%

36.18%

9 PT. Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI)

BUMI

-

8.14%

-

20.17%

*Data not available
Source: 2008 and 2010 Company Annual Reports

to the first quarter of 2009 on all economies (advanced, emerging, and low income). Although
outflow in low income economies is slower
compared to other more advanced economies
(http://www.tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/
FDI), Indonesia is classified under emerging
economies with a clearly impact in FDI as Indonesia’s FDI dropped by USD 790 million in
2009 as compared to 2008 (Indexmundi). However, the effect on contagion cannot be concluded from FDI flow alone.
Table 1 shows selected LQ45 stocks along
with the shareholders composition of each
stock, separated into government and foreign
shareholders, in 2008 and 2010. LQ45 is a stock
market index for the Indonesia Stock Exchange
(IDX). The LQ45 index consists of 45 companies that fulfill certain criteria in terms of high
market capitalization and transaction value in
the last 12 months, listed company for at least
three months in IDX, good financial conditions,
prospect of growth, and high transaction value
and frequency (as per IDX criteria). The foreign shareholders percentages show that it is
the minimum as available in the public information and company’s websites. The remaining
percentage goes to major shares by domestic institutions and public (each with less than 5%
shares). The selected stocks consist of financial
institutions, infrastructure, and commodity.
Titiheruw et al. (2009) pointed out that no
financial institutions had any direct exposure
to the subprime mortgage problem. Indonesian
bank’s indicator of Capital Asset Ratio (CAR),
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Return on Assets (ROA), etc. showed resilience
in the early stage of the crisis. In macro level,
the financial crisis “clouded” the outlook of
Indonesian economy. However, stock performance is not solely dependent on a company’s
performance. Shiller (2000) said that irrational exuberance (as coined by Alan Greenspan)
causes stock prices to be overvalued or undervalued most of the time. Shiller describes irrational exuberance as “a heightened state of
speculative fervor”.
Thus, the contagion effect is an interest for
policy makers, portfolio managers, economists,
and the general community. Any evidence of
contagion will serve as a future notice for investors, policy makers, and general community on
how to react if there is any global event which
potentially affect the economy.
In this literature, the day 15th September
2008 was considered as the defining date in
which Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy
and the US government decided not to support
Lehman Brothers. Of course, arguably, the crisis could be defined starting March 2008 when
Bear Sterns was sold to JPMorgan Chase with
the help of Federal Reserve, or even as early as
spring 2007 in which the credit rating of Private
Mortgage Backed Securities was downgraded.
However, 15th September 2008 date is chosen
as the start of the crisis in this paper is the clarity of the event i.e. the announcement of the
first major failure (bankruptcy) during the crisis
period. This date is supported as the end of the
subprime phase and the start of the global crisis
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as well by Sahalia et al. (2010) when examining the macroeconomic policy changes during
the crisis.
This paper shall attempt to analyze whether
there was any observable impact on the very
initial stage of, arguably, the start of 2008 financial crisis on the stock performance of selected
Indonesian LQ45 stocks as a preliminary study.
This will be done by comparing the stock’s
correlation with S&P index before, the first 60
days, and after the 60 days. The 60 days period
is arbitrarily chosen as the market response period to the announcement.
Using the evidence of the average correlation between those three periods, it shall be
analyzed for any evidence of contagion. The
contagion shall be observable via the increase
of correlations before, directly after, and after
the crisis period. The observed contagion will
show how interconnected the Indonesian market with the US market. Thus, this will spark
the decoupling debate on whether Indonesian
market is relatively unaffected by the US market.
The underlying question which is explored
in this paper is how the Indonesian investors
react with the knowledge of the 2008 global financial crisis. Hence, the following questions
are the focus on this paper: 1) How correlated are the performance of selected Indonesian
stocks before, directly after, and after the crisis?; 2) Was there any contagion effect in the
selected Indonesian stocks?; 3) What was the
impact in the different industry and the different shareholders’ composition from the selected
stocks?; and 4) Is there any evidence of decoupling in the Indonesian economy?
The paper will analyze the trend of selected LQ45 stock performance during the initial
timeline of what, arguably, is the start of 2008
financial panic in the United States. The choice
of the LQ45 stocks considers the nature of the
2008 financial crisis. This includes the financial
industry (noting that the crisis is triggered by
the collapse of the US financial industry), infrastructure/real estate (as the crisis arguably
started by the prime mortgage failures i.e. the
real estate industry), and commodity (naturally
the crisis will follow the drop of the demand for

commodities). In this paper, the selected stocks
for each of the described industry consist of
the government related stocks and the private
stocks for comparison.
Although the analysis of such stocks will
give the proposal of the impact of the selected
industries due to the crisis, further study will be
needed to explore all the related stocks to understand the general trend in a more expansive
manner.
Also, noting that even though the 2008 global financial crisis may trigger the movement of
stocks, other factors may not be accounted in
explaining the phenomenon. However, given
the magnitude of the event, the study gives
some views of the market movement by comparison of the three time periods.

Literature Review
Thailand currency crisis in 1997 has sparked
not only the shock in the financial market; it
also gave the new meaning of the term contagion. Claessens and Forbes (2001) found that
the term contagion is only referred as a medical term prior to 1997. A Lexis-Nexis search in
July 1997 onwards, shows the widespread use
of the word ‘contagion’ in referring to spreading of financial turmoil cross countries i.e. contagion of ‘contagion’.
Definition of contagion
Defining the term contagion is not an easy
task. Controversial at best, defining contagion
is actually an interest for policy makers, portfolio managers, economists, and the general community. If really contagion does occur, it will
devalue the concept of diversification. Thus,
defining contagion should refer also the cause
and reason of its occurrence.
The World Bank gives its version of definition not only one, but three types of definition
(broad, restrictive, and very restrictive). In summary, World Bank defined contagion broadly
by cross-country transmission of shocks or
spillover events. This is similar to the definition
as suggested by Pritsker (2000) that contagion
happens “when a shock to one or a group of
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markets, countries, or institutions, spread to
other markets, or countries, or institutions”.
The restrictive definition tags along that those
linkages are “beyond fundamentals”. The term
fundamentals here is referring to normal and
expected interdependencies amongst countries
such as in politics, trade, investment, and finances. Such excess co-movements in the definition is supported by Baig and Goldfjan (2000)
in identifying the contagion effect in Brazil due
to Russian default. The cause of these excess
co-movements can be explained by the herding
behavior due to information asymmetry. Being rational, public follows others in packs in
the absence of complete information i.e. public
exuberance. Arguably, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of US Federal Reserve (1987–2006) coined
this reaction as an “irrational exuberance”. The
third very-restrictive definition referred to the
increase in cross-country correlations during
“crisis times” as compared to “tranquil times”.
Kaminsky et al. (2003) proposed that the
reaction of contagion should be considered,
that is if the effect is immediate or “fast and
furious effect”, evolving in matter of days or
hours. This would mean that the effect of contagion differs with the effect of common news
which has gradual and relatively slower spillovers. This definition of “excess co-movement”
is consistent with the restrictive view from the
World Bank.
This paper will concentrate on the World
Bank’s restrictive view of defining contagion
in terms of correlation of between periods and
Kaminsky et al. (2003) view on the immediate
effect of contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (2000)
propose the term “shift-contagion”. This is to
explain that contagion is a shift in cross-country linkages (in terms of correlation) without
the need to explain the cause and methods of
contagion. Claessens et al. (2001) similarly define this by the cross-market linkages through
various causes and categories. In this definition, contagion is basically a measure of (stock)
prices in the propagation of shocks. Some may
argue that prices may not show any before and
after distinction during crisis, as other variables
such as quantity will (Royen, 2002). This paper,
however, is in the view that price and quantity
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correlate as well. Any changes in stocks quantity in the market will be efficiently reflected in
terms of prices. Thus, the study of prices should
capture any movements in traded quantity in
the market.
Contagion channels
The contagion mechanism can occur via
several channels. This paper would like to follow the categorization as suggested by Pritsker
(2000). The two broad categorizations mainly
touch on the fact that there is a fundamental
cause and the non-fundamental cause. “Fundamentals-based contagion” is suggested by Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and refers to the normal propagation methods via real and financial
linkages. This interdependence occurs not only
during the crisis. Hence, the term normal interdependence as suggested by some economists.
In this paper, we consider the excess of such comovements as contagion as per the definition of
contagion used in this paper.
It is important to explain these fundamentals, however, for the purpose of identifying
the normal. First, Claessens et al. (2001) listed
common shocks. This refers to the common
global shocks which potentially generate any
form of market correction internationally. Such
correction can be in the form of capital outflows
generated by, for example, change in interest
rates and/or commodity prices. Second, trade
links which refers to the connectivity between
trading partners. The real linkage here is basically stems from the open economy model of
the world macroeconomy. A slump of economy
of a trading partner will understandably reduce
the demand of goods from another country.
Third is the financial linkage. As the world becomes highly integrated, a crisis in the country
can affect others in terms of reduction of foreign direct investment, reduction of trade credits, and other capital flows. The last two (trade
and financial linkages) is widely documented.
Blanchart et al. (2010) conducted a study of the
impact to the 2008 crisis in emerging countries
and conclude that the shocks include the sharp
decrease in exports, especially for commodity producers, and a sharp increase in capital
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outflows. Naude (2009), similarly, found that
the crisis effect in developing countries are reduction in export earnings, reduction of capital flows to the developing countries, and bank
failures and reduction of domestic lending.
The non-fundamentals channels include
herding behavior, financial panic, irrational
exuberance, and so on. The main idea here is
informational asymmetry. Countries with high
levels of asymmetric information experience
great fluctuations in asset prices, whereas countries with low levels of asymmetric information do not. When high levels of asymmetric
information are present, uninformed investors
perceive changes in asset prices in other countries as possibly reelecting information held
by informed investors, thus inducing them to
alter their expectations about the fundamental
value of assets, causing asset prices to change
(Kodres and Pritsker, 2001). The categorization of non-fundamentals is suggested by others by the name of investor behavior (Claessens
et al., 2001), market imperfections (Willett et
al., 2011), and shifts in markets sentiment unexplained by macroeconomic fundamentals
which were considered as “pure contagion”
(Bazedresch and Werner, 2000). However, the
idea is basically similar, all the channels beyond the normal interdependence which includes psychological and crowd-pressure to act
in a similar fashion rationally or irrationally.
Addressing the differences between crisis
and non-crisis factors, Forbes and Rigobon
(2000) divided the channels into crisis channels
and non-crisis channels, where the crisis channels included multiple equilibria, endogeneous
liquidity, and political economy considerations
and the non-crisis channels included trade,
policy coordination, country reevaluation and
learning, and common shocks.
Measurement of contagion
Various literatures have proposed methodologies of testing contagion. The common
methods include analyses of correlations, volatility spillovers GARCH models, VAR models, probability models, and others. As per our
definition, this paper would concentrate on us-

ing the analysis of correlations of cross-market
linkages, which basically a measure of interdependencies between two variables (Kaminsky
et al., 2003).
Simple correlation
The use of correlations of asset returns has
been used extensively in analyzing the presence
of contagion in financial asset returns (King and
Wadhani, 1990; Baig and Goldfjan, 2000; and
references cited in Forbes and Rigobon, 1999).
Angkinand et al. (2010) investigated co-movements of national stock markets using ordinary
least squares (OLS) and Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) in the US and some advanced economies from 1973 to 2009. They
found an increase in interdependence between
national stock market returns over time and
the spillover effects from the United States to
other industrial countries were greatest after the
emergence of the subprime meltdown in summer 2007, and especially after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in 2008. In the case of Indonesia, Sufian and Habibullah (2010) used a similar correlation analysis using OLS method to
measure the impact of the 2008 financial crisis
in Indonesian banking sector with multivariate
variables. The advantage of the simple linear
model is the speed of calculation. The measurement of relationship between two variables
(returns of market, for example) will churn out
a single number which shows how one variable
moves in relative to the other. The higher the
number, the more correlated they are.
Forbes and Rigobon (2001; 2002) warned
against the bias in correlation coefficient using
the simple regression method. They claimed
that using such method is “biased and inaccurate” due to the potential presence of heteroscedasticity in market returns. When stock market
volatility increases, unadjusted estimates of
cross market correlations will be an overestimate, thus potentially leading to false conclusions about the existence of contagion. The
proposed using the adjustments to the volatility during the crisis period extending the proof
from Ronn (1998) for the case of general distribution function for error terms. However, they
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also warned that the adjustments can be less
accurate in certain circumstances and “should
be used cautiously”. Such adjustments for variance, for the purpose of this paper, are not exercised in our calculation of correlation using
the simple correlation method. The reasons for
the non-adjustments are the following. First,
the result for the simple correlation serves as
a control in this paper, that is as a comparison
between the other methods applied. Second,
Baig and Goldfein (2001) argued that volatility
is an integral part of the crisis. Hence, increased
variances might form the contagion and adjustments will underestimate the test. This paper is
of this view.
Exponentially weighted moving averages
(EWMA)
Equal weighting of historical data was the
first widely accepted statistical method for forecasting volatility and correlation of financial asset returns. For many years, it was the market
standard to forecast average volatility over the
next h days by taking an equally weighted average of squared returns over the previous h days.
This method was called the historical volatility forecast. However the disadvantage of the
equal weights is when there is a case of extreme
market condition. It is suitable for a calculation
over a long period of time. For a short period
of time, however, it is unable to account for the
sudden large rare jumps. The weakness of it is
clear the attempt to estimate of a constant volatility into a forecast of a time-varying volatility.
Thus, the exponentially weighted moving
average (EWMA) was introduced to address
the pitfalls. The concept of EWMA is basically
putting higher weights in the more recent observations. Thus, any large extreme jumps will be
of less importance as it moves to the past observations. A EWMA volatility estimate will react
immediately following an unusually large return then the effect of this return on the EWMA
volatility estimate gradually diminishes over
time. This is achieved by defining a smoothing
constant λ. The larger the value of λ, the more
weight is placed on observations in the past and
so the smoother the series becomes. Obviously,
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there lies the disadvantage as well. First, the
critical decision which has to be made of the
value of λ. Second, the forecast of volatility/
correlation over all future horizons is simply
taken to be the current estimate of volatility, because the underlying assumption in the model
is that returns are independent and identically
distributed.
Aguirre (2011) did a study in the use of
EWMA as a currency trading strategy and
found that a backward looking estimate of
volatility measure, such as EWMA, is inferior
as compared to other trading tactics using forward looking measure of volatility. Nevertheless, EWMA correlation is presented here as
a comparison between methods and to give a
view whether such methodology applies to the
Indonesian market.
Orthogonal GARCH
The univariate generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) which
was introduced by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev
(1986) has been widely used due to its usage of
heteroscedasticity as a variance to be modeled.
GARCH is considered to be more preferable as
compared to EWMA, due to the convergence
of GARCH volatility and correlation forecast
to their long term average levels. EWMA, on
the other hand, has constant term structure of
forecasts (Alexander, 2000).
However, multivariate GARCH has always
been computationally challenging especially as
the dimension increases. The orthogonal generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (OGARCH) is a generalization of a
factor in GARCH model introduced by Engle
et al. (1990) to a multi-factor model with orthogonal factors. OGARCH was introduced by
Alexander and Chibumba (1996) and Alexander (2000) and later extended by Van der Weide
(2002) in the form of generalized orthogonal
GARCH (GO-GARCH).
The motive behind OGARCH is to simplify
the process of producing large covariance matrices in a regular basis. Alexander and Chibumba
(1995) propose the Orthogonal GARCH model,
based on a principal component GARCH meth-
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odology. The idea of OGARCH is simple; capturing the variability of the market due to some
defined variable and treat the rest as “noise”.
The use of orthogonal factors allows OGARCH
to run on univariate time series which reduces
computational complexity.
However, OGARCH does have its limitations. Yhap (2003) conducted an extensive
Monte Carlo study of the properties of the orthogonal GARCH model and one of his findings is that the model performs well for samples
of less than 500 observations but that its ability
to accurately track conditional covariance deteriorates substantially as the sample increases
beyond this number of observation.
DCC GARCH
To counter the problem of heteroscedasticity, Engle (2002) proposed the method of dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) which is
using a multistep of univariate GARCH, thus
“have the flexibility of univariate GARCH but
not the complexity of conventional multivariate
GARCH”. The idea is similar to OGARCH that
is simplifying the computation by fitting univariate GARCH time series.
The usage of DCC GARCH in analysis has
becoming accepted recently (Wang and Thi,
2006; Hesse et al., 2008; and Burdekin and
Siklos, 2010). Even the 2008 Global Financial
Stability IMF Reports (IMF, 2008) used DCCGARCH in analyzing the correlations of US
stock markets and some global emerging market regions.
The robustness of DCC GARCH makes it
advantageous as it takes care of the changing
volatilities and the relatively easy calculation
as compared to the conventional multivariate GARCH which difficult to optimize due
to the large number of parameters. Thus, DCC
GARCH is one of the methods which is adopted in this literature.

result of the paper in chapter 4. It seems to be
oxymoronic to speak about decoupling when
we strongly believe on the spread of globalization. However, Cigdem and Ayhan (2007)
found that it is possible to have both decoupling
and globalization at the same time. A study of
106 countries from 1960 – 2005 are divided
into three groups: developed, emerging, and
low-income developing countries. This is then
measured in terms of the correlation between
economies has changed over time as cross-border flows have expanded. They find that growth
has indeed become more synchronized among
developed economies and also among emerging economies. But, surprisingly, economic
activity in emerging economies has decoupled
from that of developed economies over the past
two decades. The impact of rich economies on
emerging economies’ growth has fallen sharply.
Rossi (2008) suggested that decoupling is
growth in one area becoming less dependent
on growth in another area. As decoupling implies a break in a relationship that was previously closely linked, this definition lends itself
naturally to discussions of changes in patterns
of correlations or influences, especially in discussions of equity markets.
It is not difficult to find the examples of this.
During the unfortunate 11th September 2001
terrorist attack on US, India and China continued to grow. Even during the 2008 subprime
mortgage crisis, Indonesia continued registering single digit growth. Although the fact that
by mid-October 2008, BRIC (Brazil, Russia,
India, and China) Index was down by 57%,
sparked a further debate of the emergence of
recoupling after decoupling.
Titiheruw et al. (2009) noted that Indonesia was in good position even until September
2008, with growth rate of 6.1% (year-on-year).
Thus, does this mean that Indonesia has decoupled?

Research Method
The decoupling debate
Following Zhang (2011), the writer would
like to also mention very briefly on the decoupling debate which might be applicable to the

This chapter will explain the calculations of
the correlations between Standard & Poor 500
(S&P500) Index, Jakarta Stock Index (IHSG),
and selected Indonesian LQ45 stocks. There are
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four methods applied in obtaining the correlations: simple correlation method, EWMA, OGARCH, and DCC GARCH. As per the World
Bank definition, the correlation is calculated
during “crisis period” and “tranquil period”.
The crisis period here is defined as the initial
60 days after the announcement of the collapse
of Lehman Brothers (day X). The writer would
like to propose one step further by defining a
post crisis period which is the period 60 days
after day X.
Data
Nine random stocks are chosen out of the
LQ45 list (February 2012–July 2012) to be
considered in this paper, namely: PT Bank
Mandiri Tbk. (BMRI), PT Bank Central Asia
Tbk. (BBCA), PT Bank Negara Indonesia
Tbk. (BBNI), PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia Tbk.
(BBRI), PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk. (LPKR), PT
Bakrieland Development Tbk. (ELTY), PT Jasa
Marga Tbk. (JSMR), PT Perusahaan Gas Negara Tbk. (PGAS), and PT Bumi Resources Tbk.
(BUMI). The reason for the choice is to observe
the co-movements of three categories: financial
institutions (BMRI, BBCA, BBNI, BBRI), infrastructure/real estate (LPKR, ELTY, JSMR),
and energy/commodity (PGAS, BUMI). Also,
for each of the categories, it is purposeful as
well to select fully private and governmentlinked institutions for comparison purposes.
As a point of reference of how the Indonesian
market moves against the US market index,
this paper shall be comparing IHSG index and
S&P500 index (which is a free float capitalization-weighted index of 500 large-cap actively
traded stocks).
Method
To detect any contagion in selected Indonesia equity market, the calculations of correlation between S&P500 and IHSG and the selected Indonesian LQ45 stocks are conducted for
three periods i.e. pre-crisis period (1st January
2005–12th September 2008), crisis period (15th
September 2008–14th November 2008 or 60
days after day X), and post-crisis period (15th
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November 2008–9th April 2012) using simple correlation, EWMA, OGARCH and DCC
GARCH.
Simple correlation
The simple correlation or Pearson’s correlation measures the dependence between two
variables and it is a measure of strength of
dependency of the two variables. This is calculated by dividing the covariance of the two
variables by the product of their standard deviations. Though the simple correlation might produce a biased result in the analysis of contagion
as it tends to rise when the volatility is high as
suggested by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and
hence lack of robustness as compared to other
methods. However, it provides a simple intuitive overview on how the series move together
and it will act as a control to compare with a
more complicated methods.
EWMA
A weighted average concept arises by giving weightage in form of factor multiplication
dependent on the data position in the sample.
An exponentially weighted moving average
(EWMA) applies weighting factors which decrease exponentially i.e. the weightage decreases exponentially as the data is older but it will
never reach zero.

(1)
The value of λ for EWMA is important to
be determined. A high λ gives little reaction to
actual market events but great persistence in
volatility and a low λ gives highly reactive volatilities that quickly die away. An unfortunate
restriction of EWMA models is that the reaction
and persistence parameters are not independent: the strength of reaction to market events is
determined by 1 – λ, whilst the persistence of
shocks is determined by λ.
The calculation of EWMA in this paper will
follow the recommendation of RiskMetricsTM

8

Suparman: The Impact of 2008 Global Financial Crisis on the Performance of
Suparman

(developed by JP Morgan Chase and Co.) of using λ = 0.94 for calculation of daily returns. It
is not dissimilar to an equally weighted average with n = 25, except that it does not suffer
from the ghost features caused by very extreme
market events. The volatilities and correlations
constructed from this matrix represent forecasts
of average volatility (or correlation) over the
next day (RiskMetricsTM technical document,
1996)
OGARCH
Orthogonal GARCH model is developed
using the basic factor model of GARCH. The
OGARCH model allows the k x k GARCH covariance matrices to be generated only from m
univariate GARCH models, where it is possible where m (number of principal components)
is less than k (the number of variables) (Alexander, 2002). The idea is to fit a univariate
GARCH model to each of the principal components of the covariance matrix, forecast those,
and then reassemble the forecasted covariance
matrix from the eigenvector / eigenvalue decomposition. Thus, it would not require a bivariate GARCH processes.
In this literature, it will adopt Bollerslev’s
(1986) GARCH (1,1) which defines the conditional variance to be as follows:

where

(2)

This is done for each principle component
X and Y (methods to get principle components
can be referred to Alexander, 2002), giving a
time varying diagonal matrix of Dt:

this is dependent on the number of principle
components are sufficiently enough in representing the market variation.
DCC GARCH
The idea of the models in this class is that the
covariance matrix can be decomposed into conditional standard deviations, and a correlation
matrix where both conditional standard deviations and correlation matrix are time-varying.
Thus, DCC GARCH superiority lies on the fact
that it takes care of heteroscedasticity, volatility, and time-varying correlation.
Similar to OGARCH, DCC GARCH – developed by Engel and Sheppard (2001) – is
estimated using univariate GARCH. Again as
with OGARCH, GARCH (1,1) in this literature
for the first step of the process is fitted for each
variable. The second step involves using transformed residuals results from the univariate
GARCH model; the dynamic conditional correlation estimators are estimated (Engel, 2002).
Using the summary of Orskaug (2009) and
Zhang (2011), the DCC GARCH is also defined
as follows:
(5)
where rt is the n x 1 matrix of log returns of n
assets, at is the mean-corrected returns of the
assets, μt is the expected value of rt, Ht is the
matrix of conditional variances of at, Dt is the
diagonal matrix of conditional standard deviations of at, Rt is the conditional correlation matrix, and zt is the errors where E[zt]=0.
Furthermore,

(3)
Thus, the time varying matrix Vt is approximated by:
Vt=ADtA’

(4)

where A is the matrix of rescaled factor weights.
Alexander (2000b) noted that the accuracy of

(6)
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Table 2. Comparison of daily returns performance for S&P 500, IHSG, and selected LQ45
stocks for the three different periods
1 Jan 2005 - 14 Sep 2008
Mean

Std dev

S&P 500

0.009%

0.009

15 Sep 2008 - 14 Nov 2008

Max

Min

Mean

Std dev

4.241%

-3.473%

-0.692%

0.046

Max

15 Nov 2008 - 9 Apr 2012
Min

Mean

Std dev

Max

Min

11.580%

-9.035%*

0.066%

0.015

7.076%

-8.930%

IHSG

0.075%

0.014

7.921%

-7.698%

-0.801%

0.041

7.641%

-10.375%*

0.154%

0.015

7.626%

-8.880%

BMRI

0.081%

0.027

13.333%

-12.941%

-0.622%

0.074

20.000%

-9.756%

0.211%

0.028

18.356%

-14.516%*

BBCA

0.116%

0.023

12.500%

-10.077%*

0.317%

0.056

12.500%

-9.836%

0.154%

0.023

13.513%

-8.387%

BBNI

0.011%

0.026

16.201%

-11.764%

-1.938%

0.076

19.608%

-23.711%*

0.297%

0.029

20.000%

-14.839%

BBRI

0.127%

0.025

13.084%

-8.824%

0.127%

0.025

13.084%

-8.824%

0.216%

0.028

16.326%

-13.115%*

LPKR

0.149%

0.014

5.941%

-6.544%

-0.483%

0.022

7.017%

-6.557%

0.067%

0.025

18.920%

-17.647%*
-18.873%

ELTY

0.067%

0.041

33.331%

-20.456%

-2.554%

0.107

19.472%

-36.170%*

0.134%

0.044

31.132%

JSMR

-0.317%

0.023

7.143%

-11.189%

-0.419%

0.068

19.737%

-14.608%*

0.248%

0.020

11.570%

-9.494%

PGAS

0.265%

0.032

21.078%

-23.317%* -0.012%

0.081

20.126%

-19.494%

0.122%

0.025

16.250%

-12.871%

BUMI

0.212%

0.030

15.842%

-13.855%

0.098

22.481%

-32.031%*

0.180%

0.044

24.369%

-16.235%

-5.299%

Source: Calculated from Yahoo! Finance (finance.yahoo.com)

Rt is the time dependent correlation matrix
and is a function of Qt, which is the covariance
matrix, is the parameter associated with the
squared lagged asset returns and λi is a weight
parameter with the contributions of
declining over time. S is the unconditional correlation
matrix of the residuals εt of the asset returns at.
In the matrix Qt denotes a vector of ones, A and
B are square, symmetric and ○ is the product
(Orskaug, 2009).

Result and Discussion
The results of the calculations as described
in the previous chapter are presented here for
the purpose of the analysis.
Daily returns of indices
Stock volatility during the crisis is one of
the most visible impacts of the crisis. Schwert
(2011) observed that the spike in stock volatility
occurred in many countries during the 2008 crisis. Furthermore, it was observed that volatility
was highest among stocks in the financial sector, but it was also high market-wide. Table 2 on
the daily stock return performance is presented.
The first thing noticeable about the two indices
is that the average daily return is remarkably
higher in Indonesia as compared to the US during the pre-crisis and post-crisis period respectively but not during the crisis period. During
the pre-crisis period, Indonesian stock market
was visibly more volatile although the volatility comes with a prize (and price), the maximum daily return is higher and the minimum is
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lower than US. Although the reaction was more
muted in the post-crisis period, the pattern was
almost similar. During the crisis period, unsurprisingly, US stock market took a less of a hit.
One can guess that this might be due to all the
money that was frantically flowing out of Indonesia and back to US.
For the banks, BRI as the best performer in
the pre-crisis period performed fairly well during the crisis period and decently in the postcrisis period. One thing to note is how well
BCA performs during the crisis period in terms
of volatility; the banks were expectedly more
volatile during the crisis period and return to
the pre-crisis period after that.
Out of the three infrastructure/real estate
stocks, one thing which can be pointed out is
how Jasamarga performed before 15th November 2008. During the comparatively short precrisis period (Jasamarga initial public offering
is on 1 November 2007), it performs badly before it regained in the post-crisis period with a
0.248% mean daily return. Bakrieland (ELTY)
appeared to be the most volatile with 0.107
standard deviation and the biggest loss of
-36.2% during the crisis period.
The commodity industry proved to be the
most volatile during the crisis period with
standard deviation of 0.081 and 0.098 for PGN
and Bumi Resources respectively. Out of the
two selected commodity stocks, the bigger
loser was Bumi Resources with a mean daily
return of -5.3% during the crisis. However, this
is reversed in the post-crisis period where the
mean daily return of Bumi Resources is higher
at 0.180% as compared to PGN (0.122%).
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Table 3. Mean value of DCC GARCH correlation results between IHSG and selected stocks
returns compared to S&P 500

IHSG

MANDIRI

BNI

BRI

BCA

JASAMARGA#

BAKRIELAND

LIPPO@

PGN

BUMI

Simple
EWMA
DCC
OGARCH
Simple
EWMA
DCC
OGARCH
Simple
EWMA
DCC
OGARCH
Simple
EWMA
DCC
OGARCH
Simple
EWMA
DCC
OGARCH
Simple
EWMA
DCC
OGARCH
Simple
EWMA
DCC
OGARCH
Simple
EWMA
DCC
OGARCH
Simple
EWMA
DCC
OGARCH
Simple
EWMA
DCC
OGARCH

Pre-crisis
1 January 2005 - 12
September 2008
0.0891
0.0541
0.0715
0.0931
0.0717
0.0535
0.0712
0.0814
0.1298
0.1328
0.1370
0.1448
0.0162
0.0220
0.0253
0.0266
0.0471
0.0037
0.0290
0.0512
-0.0378
-0.0377
-0.0155
-0.0203
0.0754
0.0595
0.0671
0.0704
-0.0113
-0.0250
-0.0364
-0.0123
-0.0226
-0.0008
-0.0086
-0.0285
0.0603
-0.0034
0.0126
0.0611

Crisis
15 September 2008 - 14
November 2008
0.1757
0.2013
0.1764
0.2345
0.1207
0.1216
0.1296
0.6024
0.1481
0.1683
0.1495
0.6642
0.0284
0.0634
0.0443
0.2324
0.0812
0.1319
0.1044
0.2705
0.3292
0.3430
0.3461
0.3392
0.2188
0.2395
0.2195
0.2176
-0.0311
0.0367
-0.0224
-0.0338
0.1839
0.2081
0.1884
0.5637
0.2500
0.2853
0.2560
0.2438

Post-crisis
15 November 2008 - 9
April 2012
0.2032
0.2037
0.2196
0.3057
0.1524
0.1476
0.1647
0.1741
0.1589
0.1657
0.1751
0.1739
0.1482
0.1356
0.1341
0.1329
0.1041
0.1081
0.1094
0.1408
0.1261
0.1203
0.1361
0.1218
0.1280
0.1178
0.1567
0.1344
0.1057
0.1014
0.1016
0.1411
0.1200
0.1267
0.1395
0.1233
0.1490
0.1806
0.1955
0.1425

Note: # for JASAMARGA pre-crisis period starts from November 2007 where it started the listing, @ for LIPPO pre-crisis period starts from July 2006.

A few observations can be made in this stage
about the daily returns of the indices and selected stocks. First, as discussed above, the increased volatility of the indices during the crisis
period is observed as well for all the selected
stocks. Financial sector, real estate, and commodity stocks are generally more volatile during
crisis period. The standard deviations dropped
to almost pre-crisis level after which. Second,
the biggest loss for most stocks occurred during the crisis period (biggest losses are shaded

in the table). Similarly, this is true for S&P 500
as well. An evidence of fast and furious contagion effect? The correlation result will further
reinforce these findings and will be presented
in the next section of this literature. And third,
the relative volatility of financial sector as compared to the others in the selected LQ45 stocks
is inconclusive. The increased standard deviations during the second period relative to the
first period are observed without discrimination
for all sectors. One exception is for BBRI, in
91
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which the volatility remains somewhat consistent for all periods. As a preliminary discussion,
it should be noted that Bank Rakyat Indonesia
(BRI) is very much focused on microfinancing,
which is proven to be resilient during the crisis
(Seibel and Rachmadi, 2011).
Results comparison
A general observation from the Table 3 and
Figure 1 is that for all the selected stocks and
the IHSG index, the correlation level seems
to rise during the initial period of the crisis
as compared to before the crisis. This result
is consistent for all methods. Looking specifically for each industry selected, the following
are observed. The financial industry correlations increase quite significantly when comparing the post crisis and pre crisis period. Again
this should not be surprising, noting the nature
of the crisis which stems from the collapse of
financial institutions. However, more interestingly, if we look at non-financial stocks, the
correlations drop after crisis period. Of course,
arguably, it can be said that the data for each
of the three periods are not consistent in terms
of the quantity. Nevertheless, the following is
observed, the increased in the correlation during the crisis period for the non-financial stock
is relatively more rapid as well, with the exception of LIPPO. Does this mean that the investors for non-financial stock displayed more
exuberance? Hypothetically this might be true.
A consistent conclusion for all methods for
the IHSG – S&P 500 index correlations is that
the increased correlations from pre-crisis to
post-crisis periods i.e. an evidence of contagion. This evidence of correlation is presented
as well by Zhang (2011) on Indonesian case. He
showed that the correlation of Indonesia to US
equity market (similarly using IHSG and S&P
index) increases during the after the 1997 Asian
crisis and the 2008 sub prime crisis. The correlation is even higher for period September 2008
to August 2010 according to Zhang.
Although the correlation which value presented in this paper is lower as compared to
Zhang’s calculation (0.4708), the reason might
lie on the fact that the periods chosen are differ-
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ent. The calculation of our pre-crisis period is
consistent with Zhang’s calculation (less than
1% difference). Thus, it can be hypothesized
that the correlation after 2010 dropped which
resulted in the low mean correlation. Again,
this supported the theory that correlation tends
to increase during the crisis period (hence, economically contagious) and drops afterwards, in
the non-crisis period.
Generally, it is observed that EWMA gives
a lower correlation as compared to the simple
correlation in the pre-crisis period and higher
correlation in crisis and the post-crisis period.
The correlations for EWMA also seem to be the
most volatile. This is not surprising as EWMA
model captures the past data overreaction. The
way covariance is calculated, by way of products of daily returns can drive the correlation
down drastically if they are moving in different
directions.
OGARCH does not seem to fare as well during crisis period as compared to the other methods i.e. over the top estimation as compared to
the other methods’ results, despite that the number of data used is over 30 following the central
limit theorem. For data of at least 190, OGARCH result is somewhat consistent as compared
to the rest. However, OGARCH seems to be
less volatile as compared to EWMA. The correlation of OGARCH and DCC GARCH are relatively more stable, in comparison, with OGARCH value having the higher mean correlation.
The stocks of financial institutions in this
paper can be categorized into the state banks
stocks (Mandiri, BNI, and BRI) and the private bank stocks (BCA). The post-crisis average correlations of state banks are higher as
compared to the private one. This should not
be surprising considering the foreign ownership
of the three selected stocks in 2008. The effect
on these three banks was so high, so much so
that they requested from the government for an
injection of IDR 5 trillion each in October 2008
(Bank Indonesia, 2008). BCA, on the other
hand, although it is slightly more than 50% foreign owned, showed a higher correlation in the
pre-crisis period and increased only slightly in
the post-crisis period.
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Figure 1. Correlation results between IHSG, selected LQ45 stocks and S&P 500
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Ignoring some discrepancies of OGARCH
correlations during the crisis period, the volatility of the correlation is lower for Mandiri, the
biggest bank in Indonesia in terms of assets,
out of the three state banks. However, it should
be noted here that BRI has the lowest mean of
correlations during the pre-crisis and the crisis
period as compared to all selected banks. Seibel
and Rachmadi (2011) studied how BRI focus
on the microbanking units had made BRI more
resilient in the face of crisis. They mentioned
that “crisis has played a crucial role in their
evolution” after going through the 1982 oil crisis and the 1997 Asian crisis. Thus, the drive
of the microbanking units in BRI might be the
reason of the relatively stable volatility of daily
returns as discussed earlier and the relatively
low interconnectedness with the US market. Although there was no visible effect of the 2008
global crisis to the overall performance of BRI,
it still impacted the stock performance of BRI.
This should not be surprising due to the nature
of the 2008 global crisis driven by the failures
of financial institutions which impacted the any
financial linked stocks.
The study of commercial bank performance
indicators from December 2007–January 2009
in terms of capital adequacy ratio (CAR), return
on assets (ROA), loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR),
net interest margin (NIM), and non-performing
loans (NPL) by Titiheruw et al. (2009) shows
that the performances of the commercial banks
were not affected in the crisis period as defined
in this paper and a few months afterwards. This
further reinforces the evidence of contagion due
to the excess correlation of the banks during the
2008 global crisis.
Due to the nature of the 2008 crisis involving subprime, it is interesting to analyze the
stock performance of infrastructure and real
estate industry in Indonesia. Again, the stocks
chosen represent the government linked and the
non-government linked stocks. Arguably, infrastructure stock (Jasamarga) might not be the
best fit to compare with the other two stocks
involving real estates, however for the purpose
of the analysis it is sufficient to see the movement of the industry that is directly linked to
the collapse of the US financial market in 2008.
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The first thing noticeable is the negative correlation for the pre-crisis period for Jasamarga
and Lippo stocks. Jasamarga is 70% owned by
the Indonesian government and is a company
providing the service of infrastructure in Indonesia; specifically they are operators of expressways in Indonesia. Thus, it can be said that
the business is relatively resilient to global economic conditions as compared to the rest of the
stocks due to the domestic focus. This is proven
by the increased revenue and operating profit in
the midst of the crisis. From the negative correlation in the pre-crisis period, it can be said that
there seems to be inverse relationship between
S&P index and Jasamarga daily returns. One
hypothesis to explain the negative relationship
is the increased demand of international products when the local currency is stronger. This
will drive the logistics movements domestically
which in turn contributed directly/indirectly to
the revenue of the expressway operator. Interestingly, although the nature of the business of
Jasamarga seems to be relatively detached from
US market, there is still effect of contagion during the crisis. The correlation during the crisis
period increased quite significantly and dropped
afterwards in the post-crisis period and remains
positive. From Table 2, it is observed that the
greatest loss during the analyzed period is during the crisis phase.
Bakrieland and Lippo are both private companies which engage in real estate development
and real estate infrastructure. Both companies
deal with residential and hotels. The initial reaction, noting the nature of the business and
the nature of the crisis, is that the real estate
industry might have a noticeable impact. And
clearly there is an evidence of contagion noting the increased correlation from the pre-crisis
to post-crisis period. Interestingly, Bakrieland
has a more positive correlation as compared to
Lippo on all periods. The reason for this might
lie on the foreign shareholder composition of
Bakrieland. A major shareholder of Bakrieland
is Avenue Luxembourg SARL (Avenue Capital
group) which American investment firm focusing on distressed securities and private equity
with regional teams focusing on opportunities
in the United States, Europe and Asia. Avenue
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capital had been steadily increasing its shares in
Bakrieland from 12% stake in November 2005
to 15.31% stake in October 2008 (currently it
is holding 12.16% stake). As a majority shareholder and investment firm which manages
funds in real estate in the US, one can only
hypothesized that the impact of the 2008 crisis will cause a noticeable capital outflow. Another possible reason for the close correlation
is Bakrieland investment on the prime central
business district in Jakarta which is usually the
center of for big multinational companies in Indonesia.
Lippo shareholder composition, on the other
hand, is majorly owned by Pacific Asia Holding Ltd (17.88% as of March 2012) which is an
affiliation of Lippo Group. Besides focusing in
real estate development, Lippo’s portfolio also
encompasses shopping centers and hospitals.
The diversification explains the negative correlation in the pre-crisis period. The strong consumerism has always been the selling point in
Indonesia. With the stronger Rupiahs, spending
tends to increase. However, it can be observed
that even with that Lippo still bear the brunt of
the crisis. A stronger correlation is observed
and the biggest daily return loss (-17.6%) was
observed during the post-crisis period.
Interestingly, the real estate and infrastructure stocks were not impacted as greatly as the
banks. Despite so, the evidence of contagion is
clear. The increased correlations are observed,
despite lower in comparison with the banks.
Two commodities/energy stocks chosen in
this paper are government linked (PGN) and
private (Bumi Resources). PGN is a company
which is currently held 57% by the government and 43% by the public. Out of the 43%,
84.08% is held by foreign owners (as of December 2010). PGN deals with producing and
trading of natural gas either domestically or for
export. PGN proved to be fairly resilient in the
face of the crisis. In fact, the biggest loss occurred in the pre-crisis period. However, it cannot be denied that the crisis is contagious even
towards the commodity stocks as shown by the
increased correlation.
Bumi Resources, on the other hand, deals
with mostly coal business although they have

some production in iron ores, oil, and natural
gas. The biggest shareholder of Bumi Resources
(as of February 2012) is Vallar Investments UK
Limited (29.18%) followed by Citibank London
(3.41%), Interventures Capital (2.71%), and
Bakrie & Brothers (2.64%). The rest of 62.07%
is held by public. From the correlation, besides
the evidence of contagion, it can be seen that
the correlation is higher as compared to PGN.
Both Bumi Resources and PGN are comparatively more affected during the crisis period towards to US market. This should not
come as a surprise as the price index of the coal
and natural gas market are affected greatly by
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).
Although China and India were increasing its
coal consumption, BUMI was affected greatly
by the steady drop of the coal price to more than
50% by the end of 2008.
Titiheruw et al. (2009) found that out of the
10 companies with the biggest market capitalization on the stock exchange for 2008 which are
dominated by banking (Bank Mandiri, BCA),
mining (Bumi Resources, Adaro Energy, and
PGN), plantation (Astra Agro Lestari) and telecommunication (Telkom, Indosat) companies,
only the telecommunication companies were
considered as having a better outlook, owing to
its domestic orientation. “Banking, mining and
plantation are predicted to be severely affected
by the global crisis”. From our analysis, it is
decidedly so.
Also, another consistent fact found in this
analysis is that foreign majority shareholders
which are closely lined to the US market is
more correlated as compared to the stocks with
majority of Indonesian government. It seems
that stocks which are held majorly by the Indonesian government seem to do much better in
the face of the 2008 crisis.
Decoupling or lagged response?
As discussed earlier, the debate on the possibility of decoupled Asia (or Indonesia) was
heavily discussed in the past. Until September
2008, Indonesia was relatively healthy economically with the growth rate was still recorded at 6.1% (year-on-year). The weakened
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export growth had weakened was balanced by
the increasing import of capital goods. Thus, it
is suggesting that some investment activities
were still taking place (Titiheruw et al., 2009).
However, together with the rest of the world,
prospects for Asia and the Pacific changed significantly with the collapse of Lehman Brothers
in September 2008 (Filardo et al., 2009).
The low correlations of selected stocks support this evidence of the decoupled era in which
very little relation between the stock performance with the US market. The abrupt change
in the correlation, however, showed that the
stock market is not decoupled after all. With the
increased foreign capital flow which reached
the peak in second quarter of 2008, Indonesia
was hit contagiously by the 2008 crisis.
It can be observed the lagged response in the
Indonesian market. Some of the biggest daily
loss occurred in the post-crisis era. The lagged
response might signify the slow recoupling to
the rest of the world.

Conclusion
After discussion of the 2008 global financial
crisis, contagion, and the investigation of comovements of the daily stock returns between
the Indonesian stock index and selected LQ45
stocks and the US S&P500 index through various methods of correlation analyses, this chapter will attempt to summarize the major findings
of our study. At the same time, it will attempt
to provide some recommendations of actions
which can be taken for similar occurrences in
the future.
Thus, attempting to answer the problems as
identified in the first chapter, this paper suggests several issues. In general, the result shows
that there is an increased interdependence between Indonesia and US between the pre-crisis,
60 days from event of Lehman Brothers collapse, and the post-crisis period. Also, looking
at the selected stocks from different industries,
the same result applies as well. This result is
consistent for all the methods applied (simple correlation, EWMA, OGARCH, and DCC
GARCH). Such results infer that there is contagion effect from the US stock market to In-
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donesian stock market. This result is consistent
with the study done by Wikanti (2011) using a
different method of Vector Autoregression and
Vector Error Correction Model when the comparison is between IHSG and Dow Jones Composite Index. Wikanti (2011) added that at least
within a day, IHSG would follow any slump observed in the Dow Jones index. “This contagion
is a direct one where the regional markets do
not serve as transmitter of the crisis”.
It is found that the crisis affected the financial and commodity stocks greatly as observed
in the selected stocks. Interestingly, the infrastructure and real estate stocks were not as affected as much in comparison although the crisis rooted from such industry. This confirms the
previous study by Titiheruw et al. (2009).
It is also observed that for the selected
stocks, those which the Indonesian government
is a major shareholder were less volatile as
compared to those which shareholders’ compositions do not contain such. Looking at how the
global crisis increased the outflow of foreign
direct investments, it should not be a surprise
that stocks with majority of foreign shareholders were affected more greatly in general.
The fact that Indonesia seems to do relatively well before the crisis – with double digit
growth_–_gives the perception of decoupling.
However, it is found that both emerging and
developed economies growth rate declined
at a similar magnitude when compared to the
pre-crisis period (Didier et al., 2011). Thus, although the Indonesian economy appeared to be
more resilient in the face of the crisis, there is
no evidence of decoupling during the crisis.
The lesson learned from the 1997 financial
crisis has equipped Indonesia with the necessary experience to act on the 2008 crisis. And
from the latest experience, it is clear that specifying the crucial signals are important to identify and plan for a better response. The signals
can be in the form of changes of economic indices of advanced economies. A few lessons can
be learned here in for the policy makers. Domestic indices such as the Indonesian Stock Exchanges Index or certain stocks financial performances may prove to be useless if it is used
primarily due to the low correlation in the face
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of non-crisis i.e. a more decoupled economy.
Hence, trigger points such as outflow of foreign
direct investment, currency depreciation, and
lower export balance might prove to be too late
to be used as signals to act. Conversely, trigger
points should include international signals such
as the volatility of selected area/ country indices, overseas local events – which potentially
global-inflicting and even regional political climate. However, the idea is not to overreact but
to plan ahead the transmission of the crisis.
The Indonesian government has taken some
steps in dealing with the the liquidity problem
in the domestic financial market. Some of the
steps taken include reducing the reserve requirement ratio, relaxing accounting rules in
marked-to-market asset valuation in October
2008. After which, Bank Indonesia reduced the
interest rate to induce the cut in lending rate
(Titiheruw et al., 2009).
One of the choice is to strengthen the domestic fundamentals to hedge the slow down of
international economy. Capital inflows experienced during the 1997 crisis has proven to be
fatal. This experience should be considered in
promoting a stable domestic trade growth and
policy adjustments in the area of interest rate,
exchange rate, inflation, capital flows, reserves,
and political environment.

Fiscal stimulus in Indonesian case should
be properly assessed in size and implementation steps. The speed of government spending
is proven at times not fast and efficient enough.
Titiheruw et al. (2009) noted that for the year
2008, the government only managed to spend
50.7% of the budget in the first nine months.
Thus, the government should be cautious in the
implementation of fiscal policy without proper
elaboration.
It is undeniable that the interdependency of
the global economy is increasing as the global
trade and the ‘flattening’ of the world. Thus, the
role of international and regional organization
(such as IMF, WTO, ASEAN, etc.) is growing
in importance to ensure a global and regional
cooperation in the face of crisis to limit the impact via mutual financial cooperation.
Lastly, further research can be done for more
stocks of the selected/ different industries to
further evaluate whether the contagion impact
is indeed a national wide. This paper only focuses the correlation between the Indonesian
and US equity market; future study can be conducted to investigate the correlation with other
regional economy. The study of comovement
between Indonesia and Europe might be of relevance due to the condition of Europe at the
point when this paper is being written.
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